Learning from experience to improve future infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPPs) is a focal issue for policymakers, financiers, implementers, and private sector stakeholders. An extensive body of case studies and "lessons learned" aims to improve the likelihood of success and attempts to avoid future contract failures across sectors and geographies. This paper examines whether countries do, indeed, learn from experience to improve the probability of success of PPPs at the national level. The purview of the paper is not to diagnose learning across all aspects of PPPs globally, but rather to focus on whether experience has an effect on the most extreme cases of PPP contract failure, premature contract cancellation. The analysis utilizes mixed-effects probit regression combined with spline models to test empirically whether general PPP experience has an impact on reducing the chances of contract cancellation for future projects. The results confirm what the market intuitively knows, that is, that PPP experience reduces the likelihood of contract cancellation. However, the results also provide a perhaps less intuitive finding: The benefits of learning are typically concentrated in the first few PPP deals. Moreover, the results show that the probability of cancellation varies across sectors and suggests the relative complexity of water PPPs compared with energy and transport projects. An estimated $1.5 billion per year could have been saved with interventions and support to reduce cancellations in less experienced countries (those with fewer than 23 prior PPPs).
Introduction
"Experience is the teacher of all things," offered Julius Caesar in his commentary on the Roman Civil War of 49-48 B.C. -an adage that has held fast for over 2000 years as common wisdom about the importance of learning through experience, particularly in situations characterized by complexity. In the case of public infrastructure projects, which are intrinsically complex arrangements with large investment requirements and important implications for economic development and the health and quality of life of the citizen public, the stakes are high to learn from experience to deliver infrastructure services more efficiently and effectively than in the past.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure require that governments learn how to harness the strengths of the private sector while preserving public interest and affordability of infrastructure services, all within long-term contractual relationships subject to inevitable uncertainties over time. The PPP -while a powerful and effective tool for infrastructure deliveryrequires sound design and management, a good appreciation of public direct and contingent liabilities, a certain degree of customization to the local context, and the management of relationships between the public and private sectors over long periods. These requirements and their fine calibrations are neither apparent nor fully standardized. Rather, they must be understood, enhanced, and designed by the PPP participants -i.e., governments and sponsors -to improve PPP arrangements, with the expectation of increasing the likelihood of future contract success. This paper asks how country experience with PPPs impacts the probability of contract cancellation -an extreme form of PPP failure -for future infrastructure PPP contracts. The results suggest that PPP experience does, indeed, reduce the likelihood of contract cancellation. These results are an important starting point for ongoing research on the multiple channels by which experience and lesson-drawing may be leveraged to improve PPP performance, contract management, and government support over the future.
Learning, experience, and PPP
A fairly well-developed management literature -particularly relating to joint venture models, concession models, strategic alliances, and other types of business-to-business partnerships -and a nascent "policy learning" literature attend to the importance of experience-based learning to the success of complex organizational arrangements. In addition, a large and growing body of work by PPP practitioners, including those within government, the private sector, and multilateral development organizations, has focused on cataloging "lessons learned" for PPP implementation across different sectors, political and economic contexts, and levels of government. The perceived importance of organizational, relational, and technical learning to improved performance is apparent in the proliferation of reports, papers, and other publications focused on case studies and lessondrawing for infrastructure PPP.
Learning is expected to improve the generation and utilization of useful knowledge to help governments avoid future policy failures and increase the potential for greater success with respect to future policy goals and outcomes (Howlett, 2009) . Failures may be attributable to inability to anticipate the consequences of a program, particularly in the face of unforeseen risks (Howlett, 2009; Bovens and t'Hart 1996) , poor execution during implementation (Mandri-Perrott and Bisbey, 2016; Linder and Peters, 1987) , failure to effectively evaluate policies and programs or learn from evaluation to improve future design (May 1992) , or the general intractability of a "wicked problem," for which there is not clear and apparent cause nor solution (Head and Alford, 2013) .
A PPP might be subject to any one of these roots of failure, and the PPP literature quite actively examines why some PPPs fail and others succeed, with studies varyingly focusing on such factors as contract management, regulation, PPP frameworks, governance, principal-agent problems, and government capacity, among other factors. The common thread in these studies is that PPPs are complex arrangements that require the alignment and constant adjustment of many working parts to succeed over the long-term -requirements that demand multiple kinds of learning to discover, finetune, and maintain workable arrangements.
"Thick learning" for PPP
Since PPPs are complex organizational forms that must necessarily balance different and sometimes-conflicting interests and incentives of the public and private sectors, and because successful implementation requires dealing with distinct local legal, financial, regulatory, economic, and physical contexts, it would naturally be expected that multiple kinds of learning would be needed when implementing a PPP in a new market. This multifaceted learning is what policy scholars refer to as "thick" learning (Howlett, 2012) , in that it necessarily entails learning across program, process, and political dimensions (McConnell, 2010) .
Moreover, because some PPP situations are unique, shared knowledge that emerges through practice and engagement is likely to be important to improving PPP arrangements. While a syntactic perception of knowledge assumes that information can be collected and transferred, and a semantic view emphasizes interpretation, the pragmatic approach sees knowledge as "localized, embedded, and invested in practice" (Weber and Khademian, 2008) . This practical knowledge -or "metis" as termed by Scott (1998) evolves through practice and is tied to the experiences and relationships of the participants, who jointly build knowledge to create better-fitting policies, adopt a more unified mental mode, and align values and interests (Weber and Khademian, 2008) . Metis is particularly important when information needs are unclear, problems are multifaceted, and differentiated solutions are required.
New infrastructure PPPs may incorporate technical components informed by sector-wide best practice or case studies of similar infrastructure projects. However, not all PPP-related lessons and best practices can be automatically transferred to new contexts. Some knowledge must be hard won over time as partners collectively generate knowledge specific to the conditions at hand and overcome initial obstacles in the operating context. For example, as countries undertake early PPPs, they may discover regulatory or legal challenges that require resolutions or improved governmental capacities (such as contract management) that require development, which, in turn, improve the design, implementation, and oversight of projects to follow. Moreover, while participants bring individual knowledge to a new PPP, this knowledge can be difficult to transfer and challenging to integrate into a functioning compilation without experience. For this reason, demonstration projects -those first PPPs implemented by a country -are recognized to be pivotal learning experiences for governments initiating a PPP program and supportive PPP framework (Delmon, 2009 ).
Lesson-drawing from PPP experience
Governments, policy think tanks, multilateral development organizations, consultants, rating agencies, and other parties with interests in infrastructure PPP have produced an extensive body of literature and reporting on lessons learned from PPP experience. The World Bank's PPP in Infrastructure Resource Center, for example, provides an extensive listing of links to PPP case studies and lessons learned produced by multilateral development organizations and governments.
1 Lesson-drawing and dissemination are geared toward improving the likelihood of future project success and avoiding some of the most deleterious pitfalls that have caused prior PPP distress and cancellation. Extensive reports have been produced that discuss lessons related to contract design, legal frameworks, modes and approaches to risk allocation, pricing, bidding and award methods, financial structures, public support mechanisms, project preparation, political risks, and other factors relevant to PPP implementation.
Many developed countries with extensive and long-standing PPP experiences have also seen the value of cataloging lessons learned to improve the legislative, regulatory and policy environment and associated governmental mechanisms for PPPs. For example, the United Kingdom, whose Private Finance Initiative (PFI) of the early 1990s has undoubtedly influenced governments, sponsors and lenders, continues to evolve their program to improve how government facilitates and manages PPP contracts. The UK Treasury's 2011 "PFI" report cited a number of weaknesses in the prevailing PFI model, including inflexible contracts, limitations in transparency with respect to investor returns, higher than expected risk premiums incurred by government, and questions over public value for money, all leading to the recommendation of an evolved "PF2" model of PPP.
Given the efforts to evaluate, compile, and disseminate lessons learned through active and concluded PPPs, it is a worthwhile pursuit to ask whether governments do, in fact, learn from PPP experiences to improve future PPPs. While the purview of this paper is not to diagnose learning across all aspects of PPP globally, we more simply ask whether experience has a limiting effect on the most extreme cases of PPP contract failure -premature contract cancellation. To answer this question, we quantitatively model the effect of experience with PPP on future contract performance using a large data set.
Data and PPP country experience
The descriptive statistics and econometric models reported in this study are based on data from the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database, which tracks infrastructure projects in developing regions that entail some form of private participation since 1990.
2 As of August 2016, the database includes 7192 projects across 139 countries with recorded variables for each project, including project status (active, canceled, or concluded), project sector and subsector, committed investments, contract duration, contract form, multilateral support, and project sponsors, among other variables.
Of the 7192 projects in the database of projects with some form of PPI, 5478 are more narrowly defined as "PPP." This set excludes projects for which the degree of private participation tends toward the extreme-private side of the public-private spectrum. They are either full divestitures (i.e., total privatization of an asset) or "merchant" projects, where a private sponsor builds a facility for which no government revenue guarantees are provided (thus bearing all construction, operating, and market risks).
A further limitation is imposed on the data set: we include only active or canceled projects that reached financial closure before 2011. The reason for truncating the data set to include only the 3400 PPP projects with at least a 6-year history is simple: a project's status (i.e., conclusion after full contract term, early cancellation, and ongoing operation) is only reasonably observable and measurable when the project has been (or could have been) in effect for a sufficient amount of time. Contract cancellation rates would undoubtedly be underestimated if 1-year operational projects were included, for example, as these projects are likely too early in their development to reveal potential problems that might otherwise lead to cancellation. On examining the project data in the PPI database, canceled projects exhibit an average duration (between financial closure year and cancellation) of 5.89 years (Marcelo and House, 2016) . This average duration is justification for truncating the data set to remove projects whose closure dates are <6 years before the analysis.
Of the 3400 PPPs with at least 6-year histories, 94% are active -i.e., operational or under construction -while 6% (191 PPPs) were canceled. Figure 1 describes the subsets of data used for modeling, and Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 2833 projects used in modeling.
To capture the effect of country-level experience on PPP cancellations, a variable to proxy the degree of familiarity and experience in facilitating PPPs was estimated. The PPP country experience associated with each project is defined as the number of PPPs that reached financial closure within the past decade in the same country (Annex 1). Hence, then, the level of PPP experience associated with any project initiated in country j in year t, is equivalent to the sum of all PPPs that reached financial closure in that country in the previous 10 years.
Following this definition, Figure 2 gives a visual overview of the maximum PPP experience reached by each country over the past decade from 1990 to 2016 (Annex 2). African and Central Asian countries have the lowest levels of PPP experience in the developing world, though the region includes three countries (i.e., South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria) with >20 PPP deals. In contrast, South American countries have relatively high levels of PPP experience, led by Brazil (387 PPPs). China and India are developing countries with the highest PPP experience, with >600 PPP deals each.
Methodology
The question this paper seeks to answer is straightforward: does a country's experience with PPP reduce the probability of project cancellation? To answer this question, this study utilizes mixed-effect probabilistic models in combination with linear and cubic splines to examine the role of experience on project cancellation rates.
Effects of PPP experience on the probability of contract cancellation
Within a country, PPP projects are generally subject to the same macroeconomic and legal environments. They typically align with a national development plan and follow common sector and investment policies. At the same time, other important actors and organizations such as multilateral development banks (MDBs), operators and sponsors, and private financiers have an equalizing effect on the PPP environment at the country level (Marcelo and House, 2016) . Common exposure to national level factors could mean that PPPs do not behave independently. Rather, they may be significantly correlated at the country level. In this context, the study of their outcomes (e.g., PPP cancellation rates) must follow a strategy that accounts for such a clustered structure -i.e., a multilevel structure -to avoid potential biases in the analysis. 4 As described by Guo and Zhao, "multilevel modeling corrects for the biases in parameter estimates resulting from clustering. In contrast to the popular belief, ignoring multilevel structure can result in biases in parameter estimates The advantage of using multilevel or mixed-effect models over traditional econometric cross-sectional or pooled regression models is that they allow the correction of biases in parameters and standard errors that result from clustering of projects at the country level. As mentioned above, outcomes of projects in the same country are likely to be correlated, since PPPs are subject to the same socioeconomic, political, regulatory, and legal environments. Neglecting this correlation could lead to incorrect statistical inferences. This bias can be corrected by utilizing a mixed-effect regression approach (Guo and Zhao, 2000) .
This study uses mixed-effect probit models to analyze cancellation rates. We describe the logic and construction of this model in three steps. First, in a mixed-effect or "multilevel" model, the intercept and the estimated coefficients may randomly vary between different clusters (e.g., clusters defined by countries), or even groups of clusters that define a hierarchy (e.g., region-country-project).
5 For example, if PPP projects are clustered at the country level, a significant part of the variation in the probability of cancellation would be due to the fact that PPPs belong to a particular country. This would mean that PPPs do not behave independently at the national level. This clustering effect is hypothesized, but not known in practice. To test for clustering, this study applied standard intraclass correlation tests ( Table 2 , "empty model," intra-class correlation coefficient).
Second, mixed effect probit models and traditional probit models follow the same basic logic. A dependent variable (the probability of a positive outcome) is a latent (non-observable) variable that can be proxied by an observed binomial phenomenon. Despite the fact that the probability of contract cancellation is not observable at the project level, the current status of each project is observable. In this case, a dummy variable denoted as "Status" equals one if the PPP project is canceled and zero otherwise.
Third, while a number of factors may explain the behavior of the probability of contract cancellation, this study focuses mainly on the role of country PPP experience. The data presented in the following sections suggest that cancellation rates do indeed decrease as countries gain PPP experience (as PPP country experience is defined in the data section). To better understand this behavior, the econometric models presented in the results section use several transformations of the variable country PPP experience to allow an accurate understanding of the shape of the relationship between cancellation and experience.
Cancellation rate estimation based on splines 6
The observed data suggest that the relationship between PPP cancellation rates and country PPP experience is not linear, but rather asymptotic (Figure 3 ). On average, the observed cancellation rate for projects initiated in countries without any prior PPP experience is 22%. This cancellation rate drops to nearly 8% when countries have closed at least 50 PPP deals. Interestingly, most of the reduction in cancellation rate is reached with an approximate range of country experience of only five to ten PPP deals. In a case like this, where the relationship to be analyzed is so markedly curved, the use of linear splines and restricted cubic splines may be more appropriate than a linear equation (Gould, 1993) .
A linear spline (denoted as LSpline in the Results section) allows the estimation of the relationship between y and x as a piecewise linear function composed of linear segments. Each linear segment captures the effect on y when values of x vary within a certain range. That is, the linear spline transforms an explanatory variable into segments and estimates the slope of the linear function as well as biases in their standard errors. The more highly correlated the observations are within clusters, the more likely that ignoring clustering would result in biases in parameter estimates" (2000). 5 Mixed-effects or multilevel models are also referred to as hierarchical modes. between y and x for each segment. In turn, the linear segments join at pre-defined "knots," or inflection points, in the slope. In this case, five knots were arbitrarily placed at 12, 24, 48, and 96 PPP projects of country experience (Annexes 4 and 5).
7
Transformation of the variable PPP country experience through auxiliary variables -linear segments -was specified following Panis (1994) , as described below:
Where x is PPP country experience, and the seven linear segments S i join at six inflection points, or knots K i , 12, 24, 48, and 96 PPP projects of country experience.
The estimated coefficient associated with each linear segment reflects the effect of PPP country experience, within that range of experience, on the probability of contract cancellation.
Moreover, a cubic spline (denoted as CSpline in the Results section) may be a better choice than a linear spline when working with pronouncedly curved functions. As shown in Figure 3 , the 7 Annex 4 presents several linear and cubic spline estimations. observed relationship between PPP country experience and the cancellation rate displays a highly curved shape. When using a restricted cubic spline, it is possible to obtain a piecewise smooth cubic polynomial function that connects at pre-defined knots. In this case, the locations of the knots (six in total) were determined by the percentiles strategy proposed by Harrell (2001) .
8
The resulting auxiliary variables follow the specification below: Where n−2 corresponds to the number of auxiliary variables to be created.
Unlike the linear spline, coefficients associated with auxiliary variables under a cubic spline specification do not directly reflect the effect of PPP country experience within a specific range on the probability of cancellation. Instead, the marginal effect of PPP country experience on the cancellation rate entirely depends on the value of the variable PPP country experience chosen to evaluate the estimated probabilistic function. Tables 1 and 3 summarize the information used in the econometric models presented in the results section. As mentioned above, about 6% of PPPs that reached financial closure before 2011 was canceled. However, remarkable differences were observed when disaggregating by sector, type of PPP, and region. First, the lowest PPP contract cancellation rate is observed in the energy sector (3.2%) -a rate that is less than half the cancellation rates in transport and water and a fifth of that observed in the ICT sector.
Descriptive statistics
Second, the cancellation rate for new infrastructure projects or "greenfield" projects (4.3%) is about 60% of the brownfield concession project cancellation rate (7.1%) and 31% of the management and lease contract cancellation rate (13.7%). Finally, from a regional perspective, the highest cancellation rate was registered in Africa (9.6%), with a rate almost 70% higher than those observed in East Asia and the Pacific, East Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. Compared with South Asia (SAR), Africa has a cancellation rate 7 times higher ( Table 1) .
In terms of the size of the PPP projects under study, the average investment committed to a PPP project at the time of financial closure was US$258 million, though half of these projects did not exceed US$78 million in size. Only a quarter of the PPPs that reached financial closure before 2011 surpassed the average investment size (Table 3 ). Table 2 presents econometric estimations, including the various functional specifications described in the methodology section (see also Annex 3 for summary statistics of independent variables in the spline models). As mentioned before, the objective of the econometric analysis is to provide a better understanding of the effects of PPP country experience on the PPP contract cancellation rates, with particular emphasis on the shape of the relationship between cancellations and PPP country experience. Moreover, it is of interest to examine variations in the influence of experience in different sectors.
Results
First, PPP projects do not behave independently. Instead, their outcomes are clustered at the national level. Nearly 25% of the variation in the probability of contract cancellation is due to country-level clustering (Table 2 , Empty model, Intra-class correlation). This means that a significant part of the variation in the probability of cancellation is due to the fact that PPPs belong to a certain country. In this case, multilevel or mixed-effect models allow the correction of potential biases in parameters and standard errors resulting from clustering at the national level.
Second, PPP country experience has a negative effect on the probability of PPP contract cancellation. In other words, as countries gain experience in PPPs, the likelihood of subsequent PPP deals ending in cancellation is significantly reduced. Each additional PPP project added to a country's PPP experience is expected to reduce the probability of cancellation by 0.029%, on average ( Table 2 , basic model).
9 This simple linear functional specification, however, does not reveal how the rate of reduction varies at different levels of PPP country experience. The data suggest that the relationship between cancellation rates and PPP country experience is markedly curved (Figure 3) . Third, cancellation rates rapidly decrease as PPP experience increases, especially over the first few projects initiated in a country (Table 2 and Figure 4) . A basic quadratic specification of the relationship between cancellation and PPP experience suggests that the gains associated with PPP country experience are attained only over the first 22 PPPs (Table 2, square model).
10 However, this specification has a limitation; it does assume that, after a certain point, the experience could also be counterproductive, which contradicts intuition and the observed data (Figure 3) . Conversely, linear and restricted cubic splines do not impose such an assumption.
All the models reveal that the "experience benefit" from each additional PPP is greatest for the first few deals. After five projects in a country, the reduction in the probability of cancellation from each additional PPP project is considerably diminished. A linear spline specification predicts that the probability of a PPP project to be canceled is 15% when the country to which it belongs has no PPP experience (Table 2, LSpline1 and LSpline2 models).
11 After five PPP projects of country experience, the probability of contract cancellation drops 35% (to approximately 10%). Over the course of the next five projects of the country's PPP experience, the probability of cancellation is expected to fall another 38% (to nearly 6%), with almost no change in the probability of cancellation for PPPs when country experience ranges between 50 and 150 projects.
A restricted cubic spline functional specification generates very similar results: The probability of cancellation is about 16% when countries have no PPP experience, but the cancellation rate rapidly reduces as countries gain PPP experience (Table 2 , CSpline model). The probability of 9 −0.029% is the marginal effect (dy/dx) associated with the estimated coefficient -0.003 (Table 3) . 10 The quadratic function reaches a minimum when (dy/dx) = 0 and the PPP country experience is equal to
In models LSpline and Full_LSplinel (Table 3) , the probability of PPP contract cancellation is about 15% when the probability function is evaluated at SLi=0 ∀ i=1,…,6 and all the other variables at their mean value (see Annex 3).
contract cancellation drops 35% and another 33% after five and ten PPP projects, respectively, whereas the reduction in the probability of cancellation is marginal after about 20 projects of PPP experience. After this point, the probability of cancellation is close to 4% (Figure 4) .
Finally, the probability of PPP contract cancellation is significantly lower in the energy and transport sectors. In a country with no PPP experience, the probability of a PPP contract to be canceled in the water sector is predicted at 27%, while in the transport and energy sectors, project cancellation rates are expected at around 17% and 11%, respectively. These differences in sector cancellation rates for early projects in new markets suggest the relative complexity of water PPPs as compared to energy and transport projects.
More interestingly, the results show that after 20 contracts of PPP country experience, the probability of cancellation in the water sector is reduced by 63%, whereas the reductions in cancellation rates are higher for transport (70%) and energy (74%), with more rapid reductions in the probability of cancellation after only a few deals of PPP country experience (i.e., at five and ten experienced PPPs) (Figure 4) .
Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of the results, the models above were additionally estimated under several configurations of the data set. First, PPPs with shorter and longer periods of maturation were considered in a new set of regressions. Second, to eliminate the risk of biased results due to the inclusion of extremely high-experience projects, models excluding PPPs with accumulated country experience >200 and 100 PPPs were also estimated.
In the first sensitivity analysis, estimations included more recent PPPs that reached financial closure in or before 2013 as well as PPPs with longer maturation periods closing in 2007 or before. In the second sensitivity analysis, the PPP country experience restriction applied to a subset of projects in China, India, and Brazil, where the accumulated experience for some projects was higher than 200 PPPs. The restriction also applied to projects in Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico for country experience levels >100 PPPs (Annex 4).
The overall results for this new set of regressions are similar to those obtained in the reported models. The probability of PPP contract cancellation rapidly decreases after a relatively low amount of PPP country experience. The quadratic models predict that the probability of cancellation reaches a minimum at a level between 21 and 23 PPPs of accumulated country experience. Moreover, according to the linear and cubic spline models, there would be almost no reductions in the probability of cancellation beyond the 50 th deal, with an average probability of cancellation from this point between 3% and 5% (Annex 4 and 5 and Figure 5 ).
Conclusions
Countries learn very quickly from only a little PPP experience. The analysis shows that after a country closes a relatively low amount of PPP contracts, the probability of contract cancellation rapidly declines -a finding that is more pronounced in the energy and transport sectors than in water. The econometric results also reveal how quickly early experience and country-specific PPP knowledge translates into concrete benefits to future PPP performance. The practical experience of bringing PPP contracts to financial closure is most impactful over the first PPP deals (e.g., from one to ten PPPs). The experience dividend, in terms of reduced probability of cancellation, plateaus after about 20 contracts.
The sector results suggest that the water sector may require more careful, lengthy preparation, but that early PPPs are nevertheless notably beneficial to subsequent success in the sector. Based on research and experience, the observed sectoral differentiation in cancellation rates may be attributable to the very local and political nature of the water sector, where reforms are subject to the unique urban and geographical conditions as well as local customs, beliefs, and politics (Araral et al., 2011) . Further, water sector projects have tended to transfer demand risk to sponsors whereas transport and energy projects will isolate revenues or payment streams to a single paying entity, typically a government body, ministry, or agency (Mandri-Perrott and Stiggers, 2013) .
Early PPP projects offer important lessons to reduce the likelihood of future contract failures. Implementing interim oversight and evaluation programs can help capture the insights from early PPPs to improve contracts, regulation, bureaucratic capacity, and other facets of PPP implementation for future projects. Moreover, while some technical knowledge can be transferred from PPPexperienced countries to other countries without experience (e.g., inclusion of key contractual clauses, regulatory tools, costing, and pricing methodologies), some of the knowledge required to sustain healthy PPPs is undoubtedly hard-won and invested in the construction, adjustment, and implementation of the earliest PPP deals within the country. These observations have implications for the advisors that support the development of PPP programs to increase the provision of infrastructure. For one, multilaterals and other PPP proponents would do well to focus efforts on supporting countries with limited PPP experience rather than supporting easier "wins" in countries with more extensive PPP experience. Knowing that public and private resources are at a higher risk when embarking on PPPs in countries with very low levels of experience, MDBs should strategically target PPP support to countries with little or no PPP experience. The results suggest that from a regional perspective, this might include most of the African and Central Asian countries and some of the Central American and Caribbean nations. That said, MDB technical assistance should be provided to those governments that are also willing to create and preserve the conditions that enable a PPP market to develop, including institutional and legal reforms that underpin functional contracts, fair arbitration, and healthy financial markets.
With respect to financial support and managing investment risk in new PPP countries, MDBs must also take into account sectoral considerations and may choose to focus initial lending efforts in the energy and transport sectors, where cancellation rates are lower. In doing so, consideration should be given to contractual structures where revenue streams are "protected" from demand risk. This is done, for example, through the use of direct payments from government agencies in the case of energy IPPs, where payments are made by a single off-taker, or in the transport sector when demand risk is limited to remuneration through a public entity using some form of availability payment. Moreover, financial support should be offered based on careful examination of the local context before proposing PPP as a viable option, and with an eye to develop the earliest PPPs as learning-oriented projects. This means carefully weighing the option of proposing a PPP vis-à-vis other modes of infrastructure provision, including the public provision, as well as developing PPP programs with careful consideration of local legal, political, financial, and governmental conditions. Furthermore, it means building in adjustment mechanisms in early PPPs and encouraging lesson-drawing to inform future deals.
It is worth noting that a reasonable target cancellation rate for infrastructure PPPs is not necessarily 0%. Indeed, contract cancellation is sometimes found to be necessary, and cancellation rates for countries with high levels of PPP experience across all sectors are approximately 4%. Nevertheless, project cancellations are associated with high costs and the threat of disruption of critical infrastructure services. Based on the econometric results, an estimated $1.5 billion per year could have been saved with interventions and support to reduce cancellations in less experienced countries (i.e., those with <23 prior PPPs) to a 5% cancellation level.
The results of this study also have implications for future research. Future research could focus on evaluating the impact of PPP country and subnational government experience on the quality of infrastructure and service provision. At the moment, there exist only some general insights on the effects of PPP country experience based on quantitative analysis, and these are limited to the impact on contract sustenance, whereas the impacts of learning for particular facets of PPP implementation are case-based and often anecdotal. Future research could also examine the channels of learning to support future PPPs, including what impact centralized PPP units have on accumulating and disseminating lessons learned to improve the future success of PPPs and how widely-disseminated PPP "best practice" (e.g., standardized contract clauses) improves the success of future PPPs. 
